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Reforming the One Step at a Time
Justification in Equal Protection Cases
The Supreme Court recently decided that under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,' Minnesota may address environ-
mental and energy problems by banning plastic nonrefillable milk con-
tainers, even if the state does not prohibit the use of potentially harmful
paper nonrefillable containers.2 The Court reasoned that the legislature
could proceed one step at a time toward its goals, addressing the problem
of plastic containers first and leaving paper containers for later considera-
tion.' Although this justification for upholding a legislative classification
was first articulated by the Court over twenty-five years ago,' its meaning
still remains unclear. This Note provides an analytical framework for the
one step at a time justification. It argues that courts can properly rely on
the one step at a time rationale to uphold certain types of otherwise in-
defensible unequal treatment, if courts simultaneously encourage the legis-
lature to take further steps.
Part I of the Note examines the present role of the one step at a time
justification in equal protection analysis. It describes the broad range of
major cases in which the justification has been used and highlights the
inconsistencies within and among those decisions. Part II argues that the
one step at a time principle should be a doctrine of timebound legislative
purposes that would add a final step to a court's means-end inquiry. Part
III argues that the character of judicial decisionmaking hinders relitiga-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.")
2. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981).
3. Id. at 725 ("[A] legislature 'may implement [its] program step by step, . . . adopting regulations
that only partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to future
regulations.' ") (quoting New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)). Reversing the Minnesota
Supreme Court, 289 N.W.2d 79 (1979), the Court also held that the legislature's ban on plastic milk
jugs was rationally related to the goal of easing the solid-waste problem, and that the state court erred
in substituting its judgment for that of the legislature on the issue of whether plastic containers were
more harmful than paper containers. Id. at 725-27.
4. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). Lee Optical is the earliest case
generally cited for the one step at a time justification, though similar language appears in earlier
opinions. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 331 U.S. 284, 343 (1947) (Interstate Commerce Com-
mission may attack problems "one step at a time"); Semler v. Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610
(1935) ("The State was not bound ... to strike at all evils at the same time. .. .")
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tion or legislative reconsideration of one step at a time cases. It suggests
that when a court holds that statutory classifications are constitutional
solely on the basis of a one step at a time analysis, its holding should be
limited to a specified number of years.
I. The One Step at a Time Justification-An Avenue for Judicial
Deference
The equal protection clause requires courts to examine the relationship
between statutory classifications and the legislative goals the statute serves
when judging the validity of a statute.' This inquiry includes an identifi-
cation of legitimate legislative purposes,' an evaluation of the extent to
which the challenged classification furthers those purposes, 7 and a balanc-
ing of the competing interests asserted.! When a fundamental right is not
5. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1966) (classifications must have some rele-
vance to purpose of statute); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (statutory classifica-
tions must be reasonable in light of statute's purpose); Tussman & tenBrock, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 346 (1949) (reasonable classification includes all persons similarly
situated with respect to purposes of law).
Some commentators assert that equal protection analysis should not concern itself with the actual
operation of laws but with the process by which those laws are formulated. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOC-
RACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980) (Constitution concerned with procedural fairness and broad participa-
tion in processes and distributions of government). Other commentators have pointed out, however,
that a process-oriented view of the equal protection clause is inadequate or meaningless to the extent
that it attempts to be independent of substantive value choices. See Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of
Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (process theory is "radically
indeterminate and fundamentally incomplete"). Without entering the debate between the process-ori-
ented and outcome-oriented approaches, one can conclude that means-end rationality is one of the
values that courts consistently have declared to be embodied in the equal protection clause.
6. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (reinforcing wife's dependent role in family
is impermissible objective); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
("bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group" is impermissible purpose); Note,
Equal Protection: A Closer Look At Closer Scrutiny, 76 MICH. L. REV. 771, 799 (1978) ("The
requirement of a legitimate purpose is probably the single most important protection of misfit
review.")
7. The evaluation of the means-end relationship must be informed by substantive constraints; in
purely formal terms, legislative means will always be rationally, and in fact tautologically, related to
some set of ends. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 101 S. Ct. 453, 462 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("[I]f any 'conceivable basis' for a discriminatory classification will repel a constitu-
tional attack on the statute, judicial review will constitute a mere tautological recognition of the fact
that Congress did what it intended to do."); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Polit-
ical Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 654-63 (1975) (any means-end
rationality requirement can be satisfied tautologically); Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and
Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 (1972) (same).
8. Present doctrine formally recognizes two levels of scrutiny. "Strict scutiny" is appropriate when
the right asserted is fundamental, such as the right to vote or to travel, or when the classification is
suspect, such as a classification based on race. Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1103 (1969). Under strict scrutiny the classification must be necessary to pro-
mote a compelling state interest. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973) (alienage);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (right to travel). Classifications not subject to strict
scrutiny need only be "rationally related" to a constitutionally permissible purpose. See, e.g., Maher
v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977) (abortion funding); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 17 (1973) (school financing). In recent years, an intermediate level of review has emerged in
cases involving gender-based classifications. It requires that the classification be "substantially related"
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implicated and the classification is not suspect, the Court has tolerated
classifications that are underinclusive' The one step at a time rationale is
one of the justifications advanced by the Court for such legislative under-
inclusiveness.10 Yet the Court has never fully explained the meaning of the
justification.
On its face, the phrase "one step at a time" implies a series of measures
enacted over a period of time to deal with different facets of the same
problem, ultimately producing a regulatory scheme consistent with the no-
tion of equal treatment. Each step is a necessary part of the whole regula-
tory plan, but is not sufficient in and of itself. It is unclear, however,
whether a legislature may take only the first step. In Williamson v. Lee
Optical," for example, the Court upheld an Oklahoma law restricting ad-
vertising by opticians but not by sellers of ready-to-wear glasses, stating
that legislative reform "may take one step at a time . . . ." By invoking
the one step at a time justification, the Court in Lee Optical appeared to
sanction the legislature's intentions, but only to the extent that those in-
tentions continued to be implemented. The Court went on, however, to
imply that it was not concerned with any temporal scheme, holding that
"[t]he legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy
there, neglecting the others. ... .'"I Thus, it is unclear whether the Court
to an "important" state interest. See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317 (1977) (old age
benefits); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (alcoholic beverage regulation).
9. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUrIONAL LAW 997 (1978); see, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retire-
ment v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 316 (1976) ("[Wlhere rationality is the test, a State 'does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect.' ");
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913) (practical problems of government
may justify "rough accommodations").
In the last forty years, the Court has held only one economic regulatory statute unconstitutional
under the rationality standard, see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (striking down statute ex-
empting money orders from currency exchange regulation), and that decision was subsequently over-
turned. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976).
10. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 485-86 (1980) (upholding affirmative action
"set-aside" program that did not reach all minority enterprises affected by discrimination); Cleland v.
National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 220 (1978) (upholding limitation on veterans' educational
benefits not placed on similar federal programs); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105 (1976) (upholding
federal campaign financing program that limited disbursement of matching funds to candidates who
entered primaries); Joseph Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 51 (1966) (upholding
New York statute limiting certain cut-rate sales of liquor).
11. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
12. Id. at 489. The sentence continues: "addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems
most acute to the legislative mind." This language is ambiguous: it is unclear whether the Court
upheld the classification because the legislature adopted a piecemeal approach or because it struck
where the harm was most acute. If influenced by the latter reason, the Court should not have resorted
to the "one step at a time" justification. Instead, it should have declared that the parties were not
similarly situated. See p. 1784 infra. If the Court approved the classification based on the legislature's
piecemeal approach, then the case implies that a legislature should have great leeway in approaching
such problems, provided that it perceives the step it takes to be a rational, if gradual, step toward its
goal. Although the Court has not affirmatively resolved this issue, in subsequent cases involving un-
derinclusive classifications it seems to have adopted the former justification. See p. 1780 infra.
13. 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
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meant that the legislature could neglect further steps permanently or only
temporarily.14
Subsequent cases are equally unenlightening as to the meaning of "one
step at a time." The Court has invoked the one step at a time justification
to uphold classifications established after a legislature already had taken a
series of steps,"s or already had begun a process of reform.", In none of
these cases, however, did the Court hold that further steps were constitu-
tionally necessary. Rather, the Court has indicated often that although it
might have been wiser for a legislature to go further, its failure to do so
did not make the challenged classification unconstitutional. 17 In other
cases, involving legislative judgments that were not susceptible to a tempo-
ral analysis, the Court has quoted the one step at a time rationale without
any indication of its actual relevance.' These cases are not tied together
by any clear doctrine explaining the one step at a time justification, but
only by the rhetoric of judicial deference.
II. Creating a Doctrine of Timebound Purposes
In many cases decided on a one step at a time rationale, the challenged
classification, though valid when litigated, will cease to be rationally re-
lated to its purpose within a foreseeable period of time. When that period
14. This ambiguity also appears in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715
(1981), the most recent one step at a time case. In discussing the state's goal of encouraging environ-
mentally acceptable containers, the Court stated that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not deny the
State of Minnesota the authority to ban one type of milk container conceded to cause environmental
problems, merely because another type, already established in the market, is permitted to continue in
use," id. at 725, implying that a further step is not necessary. In discussing the goal of reducing
economic dislocation, however, the Court suggested that the ban might be viewed in a different light if
it were more than temporary: "The fact that the legislature in effect 'grandfathered' paperboard con-
tainers, at least temporarily, does not make the Act's ban on plastic nonreturnables arbitrary or irra-
tional." Id. at 726.
More recently, a lower court has held that a one step at a time argument will fail without some
indication that further steps are contemplated. See Delaware River Basin Comm'n v. Bucks County
Water & Sewer Auth., No. 80-1662, slip op. at 22 (3d Cir. Feb. 18, 1981).
15. See McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 811 (1969) ("[A]ppellants' challenge seems
to disclose not an arbitrary scheme or plan but.., a consistent and laudable state policy of adding...
groups to the absentee coverage as their existence comes to the attention of the legislature.")
16. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 57 (1977) (upholding amendment to Social Security
Act although it was only "one firm step" towards eliminating hardship in previous rule); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105 (1976) (upholding campaign financing law limiting matching funds to candi-
dates who participate in party primaries); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656-57 (1966) (pro-
hibition of state literacy requirements permissible even though it only benefits persons instructed in
schools within United States jurisdiction).
17. See, e.g., Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 57-58 (1977) ("Even if it might have been wiser to
take a larger step, the step Congress did take was in the right direction .... "); McDonald v. Board of
Election, 394 U.S. 802, 811 (1969) ("That Illinois has not gone still further, as perhaps it might,
should not render void its remedial legislation .... )
18. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 592 (1961)
(upholding Sunday law that imposed stiffer penalties on sale of commodities considered particularly
disruptive to Sunday atmosphere); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 n.3 (1961) (upholding
Sunday law that permitted sales of certain commodities).
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of time passes, and the classification is no longer valid, the law should be
held unconstitutional under a means-end analysis.1 9 A timebound goal is
not, of course, inherently legitimate, nor should the classification it creates
be immunized even temporarily from further analysis. 20  But if a
timebound goal is legitimate, the constitutional status of the classification
it supports should also be timebound under a means-end test.
A. Types of Timebound Justifications
There are two general types of timebound justifications. The first type
stems from a legislature's often unstated but real need to deal with each
issue that comes before it in as timely a fashion as possible, even if such
consideration involves some sacrifice of thoroughness in the legislative
scheme.2 ' This justification is common to all lawmaking; it arises from
unavoidable limitations on legislative imagination and deliberative re-
sources.22 Legislatures that considered every policy issue systematically
and completely could not function rapidly enough in responding to social
needs.
Although this limitation on the legislative process is inescapable, an
equal protection justification invoking it is appropriate only when the leg-
islature is unintentionally underinclusive 21 and dissimilar treatment can-
19. This argument holds true even if equal protection analysis should consider only whether a
legislative judgment was reasonable when it was made. See p. 1786 infra.
20. As defined here, timebound goals include only objectives premised on a set of circumstances
that will by their nature cease to exist. Thus, not all goals premised on contingencies are timebound.
The Court has recognized timebound goals in areas of the law other than equal protection. See
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (state may not institutionalize criminal defendant alleged to
be incompetent to stand trial longer than reasonably necessary to determine whether substantial
probability exists that defendant will become competent).
21. See Morse, Theories of Legislation, 14 DE PAUL L.REV. 51, 53 (1964). The need for timeli-
ness can be characterized as an implicit legislative goal. Although that goal is inherent in every piece
of legislation, it is almost never articulated. Thus, it would make no sense for courts to apply to it the
rule that only purposes articulated in the legislative record may be used to justify a statute. Cf
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 212-13 (1977) (rejecting contention that Congress intended need
to be criterion for Social Security survivors' benefits); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648
n.16 (1975) (rejecting contention that Congress intended gender-based classification to compensate
women for economic discrimination).
22. See P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 565 (1975) (legislatures have
limited time and resources). In fact, the legislative process has been likened in this regard to the
judicial process. See Moffat, The Legislative Process, 24 CORNELL L. Q. 223, 229 (1930) (legislature
is tribunal that considers "proposed changes in the rules governing our lives").
Moreover, representatives do not have time to give full consideration to each issue because of the
large volume of legislation, the amount of time they must devote to constituents, and the degree of
technical knowledge required to understand the background of every piece of legislation. Cf J. HAR-
RIS, CONGRESS AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 162 (1972) ("Congress is not organized to formulate a
broad, consistent, national legislative program dealing with the problems of the time."); Friendly, The
Gap in Lawmaking - Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 801
(1963) (because members of Congress spend at least half of their time on constituents, they can give
full attention only to a limited number of issues); Schwarz, Legislation and Legislatures, 47 SOC.
INQUIRY 234, 236 (1977) ("[Liegislators have little time to discuss and consider legislation . . .")
23. Courts should examine the legislative record to determine whether limitations on the legisla-
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not otherwise be supported. In some of these cases the time constraints
placed on legislative action do not sufficiently justify unequal treatment. 4
In others the asserted interest is so trivial there is no need for further
legislative consideration. There is an intermediate level, however, in
which the interests asserted, while not demanding immediate vindication
by the Court, are sufficiently important that the legislature should be re-
quired to consider them. For example, the legislative process justification
could have been invoked in McDonald v. Board of Election Commission-
ers, in which the Court rejected the claim that the Illinois legislature
violated the equal protection clause by failing to include unsentenced
prison inmates among classes of persons entitled to absentee ballots. The
Court found no indication that the legislature had considered providing
absentee ballots to pretrial detainees. In addition, the Court apparently
believed that once the legislature recognized its inadvertent refusal to
grant absentee ballots to unsentenced inmates, in accordance with its pre-
vious history, it would amend the law to include that group. 7
The second type of timebound justification is based on the special char-
acteristics of the problem being addressed by the legislature. Such charac-
teristics include economic considerations and factual uncertainties. In
tive process were responsible for the exclusion being challenged. If extending the benefit in question to
the plaintiff class was thoroughly considered and then rejected, the statute cannot be excused by im-
perfections in the legislative process. For example, in Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v.
Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973), the court invalidated a statutory classification that implic-
itly restricted cosmetologists to cutting and shampooing women's hair. Because the same statute au-
thorized cosmetologists to manicure the hands of both men and women, the state could not claim that
the discriminatory restriction was inadvertent, and attributable only to limitations inherent in the
legislative process. If, however, the legislature realized that it was passing an underinclusive statute
but did not have time to study the merits of other provisions, the statute should only be upheld if the
legislature has given some indication that it will enlarge the scope of its inquiry within a given period
of time.
24. The courts have rejected the legislative process justification when applying heightened equal
protection review. See Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) ("But Congress may not legislate
'one step at a time' when that step is drawn along the lines of gender. .. .") In such cases, legislative
inattention may serve as a cover for insensitivity or hostility. See J. ELY, supra note 5, at 157-60
(discussing use of stereotypes by legislature).
In addition, it may be wise to force the legislature to give especially thorough consideration to laws
restricting important rights. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (legislature must identify
instances where sex-based generalization actually comports with fact).
25. In such cases, courts should invoke simple deference rather than the one step at a time princi-
ple. See p. 1784 infra.
26. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
27. Id. at 811. The Court also could have invoked a legislative process justification to uphold
statutory classifications it upheld on the basis of purposes not articulated by the legislature. See, e.g.,
Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 220 (1978) (measure imposed was "direct
response to problems experienced in the administration of this country's GI bills" and there was no
evidence that Congress considered other federal grant programs); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 105-
06 (1976) (no indication that Congress determined whether candidates in primaries and candidates in
petition drives were similarly situated). In each of these cases, the Court invoked the one step at a
time justification without any further explanation of its significance.
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Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 8 the state legislature banned
plastic but not paper nonreturnable milk containers, partially on the basis
of economic considerations. The statute had two purposes. The first was
to encourage the use of refillable containers and thus ease solid waste
problems, reduce energy waste, and conserve natural resources. 9 The sec-
ond was to minimize the economic and social disruption that an immedi-
ate transition to refillable containers would cause.3 0 Although both pur-
poses are legitimate,3 only the second is timebound: the dairy industry
was put on notice that the legislature intended to promote refillable con-
tainers at the expense of nonrefillable containers. Accordingly, the dissimi-
lar treatment of plastic and paper containers should not be continued after
a suitable time for a switch to refillable containers passes.
The problem of factual uncertainty is illustrated by Aguayo v. Richard-
son. 2 Plaintiffs challenged a statute requiring 25% of New York State
welfare recipients to participate in one experimental work project, and
2.5% to participate in another project." In addition to its primary goal of
improving the welfare system, the legislature sought to prevent waste of
state resources on useless programs and to compare the results of different
approaches. 4 The nature of the experiment was such that the state would
learn the value of the program only upon its termination. Therefore, the
classification requiring only some of the state's welfare recipients to work
in experimental projects should have been upheld only as long as the
value of the program remained uncertain. 5
B. Proper Use of the One Step at a Time Justification
The one step at a time justification can be a valid independent reason
for a legislature to treat differently two groups that are similarly situated
with respect to one objective only so long as the second goal that justifies
the unequal treatment remains rationally related to the discriminatory
28. 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981).
29. Id. at 724-25.
30. Id. at 725-26.
31. The first goal addresses an area of legitimate local concern, environmental protection and
resource conservation, and falls easily within the police power of the state. See Huron Portland Ce-
ment Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (air pollution legislation clearly within police power).
The legitimacy of the second goal is suggested by New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 305 (1976)
(city could "rationally choose initially to eliminate vendors of more recent vintage" because they had
not built up substantial reliance interests).
32. 473 F.2d 1090, 1109-11 (2d Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 1094-96. The court upheld the classification, but did not explicitly employ a one step at
a time justification.
34. Id. at 1109.
35. The court did not impose such a restriction, declaring that the equal protection clause was not
violated if the selection of certain areas to test the program was rational, even if random. Id. at 1109-
10.
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classification. By allowing a legislature to address problems in a piecemeal
fashion, rather than requiring an all-or-nothing approach, courts en-
courage legislative creativity and accommodate political and economic re-
ality. 6 Accordingly, after a court has concluded the means-end inquiry, it
should determine whether the purpose or justification used to uphold a
classification is timebound. If it is not timebound, the court should declare
that the parties are not similarly situated and uphold the classification. If
it is timebound, the court should uphold the classification on a one step at
a time rationale, but should also indicate that the requisite relationship
between the means and the end will not continue indefinitely.
Courts should not invoke the phrase "one step at a time" as a purely
rhetorical device when no other justification for a challenged statute seems
convincing. The one step at a time paradigm should be reserved for
timebound goals; otherwise its indiscriminate use will serve only to con-
fuse legislatures and other courts. If a court desires to be deferential, it
should find other means. 7
III. Encouraging Second Steps
Statutes upheld solely on a one step at a time analysis should be recon-
sidered by the legislature or relitigated. This is unlikely, however, as long
as the courts fail to understand the full implications of one step at a time
analysis. 8 To encourage second steps, courts should add a sunset provi-
sion39 to their orders, and hold classifications constitutional only for the
specific period that corresponds to the nature of the legislature's
timebound objective. If the legislature does not act within that period, the
36. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966) (upholding Voting Rights Act,
despite gaps, because measures to eliminate voting barriers should be encouraged); Aguayo v. Rich-
ardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (2d Cir. 1973) ("The Equal Protection clause should not be held to
prevent a state from conducting an experiment designed for the good of all, including the participants,
on less than a statewide basis."); c Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 5, at 349 (courts must allow
legislators to forge and test administrative solutions to complex problems).
37. For example, in Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), discussed at pp. 1779-80
supra, the distinction drawn between opticians and sellers of ready-to-wear glasses was not based on a
timebound purpose. The Court should have required the state to show that the two groups were not
similarly situated in order to justify treating them differently. The Court still could have shown sub-
stantial deference by applying to the legislature's factual finding only a minimal level of review. Cf.
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979) ("[Tlhose challenging the legislative judgment must con-
vince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not
reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker."); United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (legislative reading of facts controlling if question is
"debatable").
38. Some one step at a time cases will be reviewed by the legislature or relitigated in the courts.
Nevertheless, the scheme proposed here would facilitate the elimination of all timebound classifica-
tions once their justification ends and they become unconstitutional. See pp. 1786-88 infra.
39. The proposed provision would be analogous to a statutory sunset rule, which terminates the
life of a program after a given number of years unless the legislature explicitly renews its mandate.
See S. BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 146-47 (1979).
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adjudication of constitutionality should lose its validity as a precedent and
as a binding determination between the parties. If relitigated, the classifi-
cation should be declared unconstitutional, unless some other justification
for it can be found.
A. The Power of Precedent
A sunset order in the context of a classification upheld on the basis of a
timebound justification is necessary because of the practical effect of judi-
cial decisions. Cases are not confined to their facts when cited as prece-
dent. Some holdings survive when no longer appropriate, forming the
background for future judicial action.4" Under the doctrines of issue and
claim preclusion," a party to the original litigation must bear the heavy
burden of showing different or changed circumstances to relitigate success-
fully.42 In addition, courts generally have held that the passage of time is
not in itself a material change in circumstances. 3
The need for a sunset order is particularly evident in light of an impor-
tant unresolved issue in equal protection doctrine. Some cases suggest that
40. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 219 (1976) ("[lit is precedent
and not specific facts that are adhered to."); cf B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
19-20 (1931) ("[Sitare decisis is at least the everyday working rule of law."); Holmes, The Path of
the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 461, 492 (1897) ("Everywhere the basis of principle is tradition, to such
an extent that we even are in danger of making the role of history more important than it is.")
41. The doctrine of issue preclusion holds that "[a] judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or a different claim, with
respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to the judg-
ment." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 45(c) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
Issue preclusion also prevents a party from contesting a previously litigated issue with a third party
"unless the first party lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action or unless
other circumstances justify affording him opportunity to relitigate the issue." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975).
Claim preclusion doctrine prevents the parties from reasserting the same cause of action once a
judgment has been given. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 45(a), (b) (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1973). The judgment need not have been on the merits, but the cause of action must be based
on the same transaction. See Glick v. Ballentine Produce, Inc., 397 F.2d 590 (8th Cir. 1968). When
claims are precluded, even issues not raised during the original litigation may not be litigated if based
on the same claim.
42. See, e.g., In re Tennessee Cent. Ry., 498 F.2d 904, 906 (1974) ("[Tihe principles of res
judicata would govern the disposition of this case, even if there had been ... a change in controlling
case law."); Barzin v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 14, 446 F.2d 1382, 1383 (1971) (res judicata
holds "even if a contrary judicial decision on the legal issues involved intervenes between the first and
second suits"); Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 80 (1970) (res judicata holds
where no substantial intervening change in controlling facts or applicable legal principles); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 61.2(0, 61.2(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) & § 121 (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1973) (change in circumstances must be substantial enough that giving continued effect to
judgment is unjust).
43. See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872, 885 (10th Cir. 1965) (mere
passage of time not sufficient to prove change of circumstances); Cory v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 391
(3d Cir. 1946) (although each year's claim against taxpayer was separate, resolution of one year's
claim was res judicata with respect to subsequent claims); Duquesne Slag Prods. Co. v. Lench, 415
A.2d 53 (Pa. 1980) (passage of 28 years not material change of circumstances).
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courts should only consider whether a legislative judgment was reasonable
when it was made."' Other cases suggest that courts should engage in an
ongoing review that may reach different results as circumstances change. 5
The analysis here is consistent with either position in this controversy.
Legislation that fits the one step at a time paradigm is inherently
timebound, even at the time of enactment, because one of its goals is in-
herently timebound. This does not mean that all legislation should un-
dergo continuing review in light of possible unforeseen changes in circum-
stances. It merely means that some laws depend for their validity on
circumstances that will change in a foreseeable period of time. A sunset
order would make it clear that a court reviewing legislation a second time
could invalidate a law that was rational when enacted only if the original
timebound justification had lapsed."
In the absence of a sunset order, a declaration of constitutionality dis-
courages reconsideration not only by courts but also by the legislature.
Once a court has given its imprimatur, the constitutionality of a classifica-
tion, justified originally by the legislature for temporary reasons, is no
longer conditioned on time. It is unlikely that a legislature will spend the
time and energy needed to look past a holding that its goals are legitimate
and sufficient to justify the classification."7 Moreover, many classifications,
once enacted, create vested interests that exert pressure to retain the status
quo, and such pressure only increases when a classification is upheld in
the courts."'
44. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S. Ct. 715, 724 (1981) ("[Wlhere
there was evidence before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may not
procure invalidation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was
mistaken."); Lindsley v. Natural Carbolic Gas. Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) ("When the classification
in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain
it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed.") According to
Hans Linde, it does not matter what the present facts are, but only that "legitimate ends and rational
means ... coincide at the time of the legislative decision." Linde, supra note 40, at 217.
45. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 (1938) ("[T]he constitutionality
of a statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by showing
to the court that those facts have ceased to exist."); Milnot Co. v. Richardson, 350 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.
Ill. 1972) (invalidating statute because no longer rational, although previously upheld in two Supreme
Court cases).
46. Similarly, if a law based on a timebound purpose is first challenged after the purpose has
lapsed, the reviewing court should strike it down, even if the court limits its inquiry to the rationality
of the law when enacted, because the rationality is timebound.
47. Cf. J. HARRIS, supra note 22, at 19 (Congress unable to enact legislation until problem
reaches crisis proportions); S. KRISLOV, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS 144 (1965)
(most Court decisions never come to attention of Congress).
48. See Linde, supra note 40, at 221 ("Even a law originally enacted to serve one pragmatic end,
such as health or safety, will remain on the books as long as other vested interests that have grown up
around the law retain legislative sympathy.")
In Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955), the Oklahoma legislature received notice in
1955 that its different treatment of opticians and ready-to-wear glasses retailers was justified only as a
one step at a time reform. The legislature did not amend the statute, however, until 1978. 1978 Okla.
Sess. Laws, ch. 37, §§ 2-6 (codified at OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 943.1-943.3 (West Supp. 1980-
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B. How A Sunset Provision Would Work
Sunset orders in one step at a time cases should have two features.
First, the court should explicitly state that it is upholding a law on the
basis of a timebound justification and that it does not expect to be able to
render the same decision some number of years hence. Such a statement
will make it clear to the legislature, other courts, and other litigants that
the statute's constitutionality is timebound. Second, the court should issue
an order carefully delineating the issues that may be raised if the statute is
relitigated, and thereby clarify the parties' rights to further causes of
action.
A sample order would state: "Judgment for defendant, without
prejudice to plaintiff's or any other party's right to bring an action to
determine whether the classification is rationally related to its timebound
purpose after x years."4 Such an order would confirm that the statute is
constitutional as of the present. Claim and issue preclusion would bar the
parties from contesting further the constitutionality of the statute for a
given number of years." Stare decisis would restrict a different plaintiff's
ability to raise the claim before the time period expired."1 Subsequently,
however, either the original plaintiff or a new one could argue that the
timebound purpose had lapsed, without having to overcome the effects of
res judicata. The defendant, on the other hand, would have to overcome
the burden of proving changed circumstances 2 in order to argue that the
classification was rationally related to another purpose or that the purpose
was not actually timebound.53
1981)).
49. Courts have issued similar orders in other proceedings. In some cases, courts expressly reserve
a plaintiff's right to maintain a second action, and in subsequent proceedings the plaintiff is not
barred from reasserting the part of the claim that was reserved. See United States v. Seckinger, 397
U.S. 203, 206 (1970) (suit by United States against contractor not barred by res judicata when claim
reserved by district court in prior action); Dudley v. King, 285 P.2d 425, 428 (Okla. 1955) (judgment
for defendant reserved question of liability but barred question whether express contract was made);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2(1)(b) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
When an action is premature or a precondition has not been satisfied, courts have held that the
parties are not precluded from maintaining an action when the claim becomes enforceable. See, eg.,
Williams v. Murdoch, 330 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1964) (petition in prior proceeding held defective for
lack of verification); Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (dismissal of prior com-
plaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
48.1(2) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
50. See note 41 supra.
51. See Duncan v. Theis, 613 F.2d 305, 310-11 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979) (previous decision
on claims identical to those in instant case should be followed on principle of stare decisis).
52. See p. 1785 supra.
53. These issues would be barred by the finding of the court in the first action. See Acree v. Air
Line Pilots Ass'n, 390 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1968) (res judicata bars relitigation of issues determined by
court and those that might have been presented). The proposed procedure imposes res judicata bur-
dens on the defendant rather than on the plaintiff, although normally the plaintiff challenging the
classification bears the burden. Thus the defendant would have an incentive to prove his claims in the
initial proceeding rather than to rely on the one step at a time justification. The defendant would also
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The proposed sunset provision would encourage second steps and still
permit the deference consonant with the level of review that the court
applies. 4 The court's order would present the legislature with four
choices. First, it could repeal the law. Second, it could amend the law to
eliminate the challenged classification. Third, if the court had limited its
analysis to purposes in the legislative record, the legislature could reenact
the law containing the classification, grounding it this time on a previously
unarticulated legitimate goal that is not timebound. Finally, the legisla-
ture could simply wait for xelitigation to occur. A sunset order thus would
allow a legislature to choose from among a number of alternatives, and at
the same time, would encourage it to undo the imbalance created by an
underinclusive statute.5
The most difficult aspect of fashioning a sunset provision would be to
determine when the second step should begin. 6 When the timebound jus-
be barred by res judicata from later challenging the court's decision to allow the plaintiff to seek a
remedy in the second action. See Erickson v. United States, 309 F.2d 760, 765 (Ct. Cl. 1962) (errone-
ous determination that particular claim must be enforced in separate proceeding res judicata between
parties).
54. The remedial scheme proposed in this Note permits courts to give a legislature time to con-
sider an issue, and thus to avoid the problem of deciding whether to invalidate or broaden a
timebound statute. If the issue is relitigated, however, and the court finds that the timebound goal has
lapsed, it must consider in each case whether the statutory classification should be repealed or wid-
ened. Cf. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 56 n.14 (1977) (problem "could be cured either by invalidat-
ing the entire exception or by enlarging it"); Note, Extension Versus Invalidation of Underindusive
Statutes: A Remedial Alternative, 12 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 115 (1975) (courts should consider
remedy on case-by-case basis). But c. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-35 (1957) (recommending that Court
return bill to Congress when Congress has failed to provide appropriate remedy).
55. A sunset provision resembles a prospective overruling, which starts not at the date of decision
but at some future time determined by the court. See Note, Prospective-Prospective Overruling, 51
MINN. L. REV. 79 (1966); df. G. CALABRESI, COMMON LAW COURTS IN THE AGE OF STATUTES ch. 11
n.2 (forthcoming book on file with Yale Law Journal) (discussing different types of prospective over-
ruling). This technique is designed to give a legislature time to reconsider an issue; it encourages
legislative action. Although prospective overruling and sunset orders may have similar effects, they
differ in several important respects. First, overruling creates a change in law, while many cases in-
volving one step at a time justifications apply well-settled law. Second, the sunset provision is based on
equal protection theory, while prospective overruling is based on prudential considerations such as the
purpose of new standards, good-faith reliance on old law, or the effect on the administration of justice
of retroactive application of new standards. Cf Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 242-43
(1977) (discussing criteria for prospective overruling). Finally, a sunset provision would not be subject
to Article III limitations. Cf Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1968) (Article III requires federal
courts to extend benefits of prospective overruling to the parties in case subjudice). The plaintiff in a
one step at a time case seeks to have the statute declared unconstitutional, and that issue is directly
confronted by the court. The fact that the court's order contains a sunset element indicates that the
plaintiff lost that issue, but is free to raise the same issue in a number of years.
56. This problem could be resolved if the litigants could agree on a date. Cf. Morales v. Turman,
383 F. Supp. 53, 126 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd and remanded, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd and
remanded, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (ordering parties to negotiate remedy after determination of viola-
tion); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. 6003, 6008 (E.D. Va. 1974), afpd in
part, modified in part and remanded, 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976)
(same). Such an agreement would not, however, relieve the court of its duty to scrutinize carefully the
chosen time period.
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tification is of the second type, one that arises from the nature of the prob-
lem being confronted, the legislature's announced objectives often may
serve as a guide to an appropriate time period. 7 For instance, the
timebound objective of protecting existing economic interests should be
tied to the economic life of the entity involved. If the state is undertaking
an experiment, the time limit should be tied to a reasonable estimate of
the experiment's duration. If the legislature has chosen an unreasonable
termination date or has neglected to set one, the court should examine the
record to determine a reasonable date."
When the timebound justification is of the first type, one that arises
from defects in the legislative process, the court would have less guidance
in arriving at appropriate time limits. The court should base its decision
on the relative importance of the interests at stake and on expert testi-
mony as to the time it would take a legislature with limited resources and
varied priorities to resolve the particular issue.59
C. Two Examples
The application of the proposed one step at a time model can be illus-
trated through a reexamination of two one step at a time cases. In Cleland
v. National College of Business," the Court determined that the purpose
of Congress was to avoid subsidizing "those [educational] institutions
which could survive only by the heavy influx of Federal payments." '61
57. The easy cases are those in which the second step is planned or will occur without further
legislative action. E.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (ban on all vendors would occur
naturally as grandfathered vendors stopped operating). If the legislature does not set an explicit time
limit but instead refers generally to reliance interests or settled expectations, the court would have to
make an independent determination.
Nonconforming use doctrine in zoning law may help determine by analogy when reliance interests
are extinguished. Under this doctrine several communities have placed a time limit on the noncon-
forming use exception to new regulations, allowing affected parties to recover the cost of their invest-
ments, but not to benefit from them in perpetuity. See, e.g., Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958) (upholding constitutionality of amortization plan); R.
POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY at 971-72 (abr. ed. 1973) (discussing noncon-
forming use doctrine); Comment, The Abatement of Preexisting Nonconforming Uses Under Zoning
Laws: Amortization, 57 NW. L. REV. 323 (1962) (arguing grace period should be long enough so that
investment is completely amortized).
58. Courts commonly examine the record in selecting remedies to achieve desegregation. See, e.g.,
Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del.), modified, 555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 880 (1977); Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 371 F. Supp. 507 (D. Mass.), aftd, 504
F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975); Martarella v. Kelly, 359 F. Supp. 478
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
59. Gf State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1972) (effective date of ruling declaring Florida
abortion law unconstitutional delayed to permit legislative revision); In re Jeruzal's Estate, 269 Minn.
183, 130 N.W.2d 473 (1966) (delaying effective date of decision overruling trust exemption until
adjournment of next legislative session); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist., 264 Minn. 279, 118
N.W.2d 795 (1962) (delaying effective date of decision overruling sovereign immunity until adjourn-
ment of next legislative session).
60. 435 U.S. 213 (1978).
61. Id. at 219.
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Congress chose to meet this objective by imposing several restrictions on
the institutions to which students could apply their veterans' education
assistance benefits."2 The statute was a response to Congress' long experi-
ence with the administration of the program, rather than a result of a
general study of the effectiveness of federal education grant programs."3
The Court should not have assumed without proof that the abuses of
the veterans' program were in some meaningful way different from the
abuses of other educational assistance programs,"" and should have upheld
the statute only on a one step at a time justification. It should have ex-
plained that the classification was timebound because Congress has been
put on notice that to pursue its purpose it eventually would have to treat
all student aid recipients similarly." The Court should then have ruled
that the plaintiff could reassert his claims at the end of one legislative
session. If the case were relitigated, the defendant should be presumptively
barred from claiming that the two programs were not similarly situated,
but should still be able to argue that the one session deadline should be
extended.
In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the Court considered a
statute that both encouraged the use of refillable containers and at the
same time protected the reliance interests of the paper nonrefillable
container industry." Unless it was shown that the plastic and paper con-
tainers had different environmental effects, 7 the Court should have up-
held the statute on a one step at a time justification, but it also should
have stated that the reliance interests were timebound. It should have in-
dicated that after an appropriate period of time the plaintiff could chal-
lenge the classification again."' This approach would have made clear to
the legislature that it could only differentiate between paper and plastic
temporarily, but would also have given the legislature time to deal with
the classification as it saw fit.
62. Id. at 214-15.
63. Id. at 219-20. It should be noted that the Court may have been less than sympathetic to the
claims presented because the party in court was a college and not a veteran.
64. See note 27 supra.
65. See pp. 1781-82 supra.
66. 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981); see p. 1783 supra.
67. For purposes of this example, the discussion assumes that there was no relevant non-
timebound difference between paper and plastic containers, as did the Minnesota trial court and the
Minnesota Supreme Court. See Clover Leaf Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 289 N.W.2d 79, 82 (Minn.
1979). This issue was in fact contested; the legislature based its classification in part on a perceived
difference in the environmental effects of plastic and paper. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery
Co., 101 S. Ct. 715, 724-27 (1981) (deferring to legislative judgment).
68. Because the record was not fully developed on the issue of the time required by the dairy
industry to shift to returnable bottles, the Court probably should have remanded the case to the Min-
nesota courts for further fact-finding.
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Conclusion
Courts have invoked the one step at a time justification indiscrimi-
nately, in large part because its meaning is unclear. If it is a mode of
disguising judicial deference, its use is inappropriate. If, however, it in-
volves a recognition of the realities of political and economic processes, its
use is commendable. Sanctioning timebound justifications is not enough,
though. The courts should also adopt the sunset provision outlined in this
Note to facilitate litigants' and legislatures' questioning of classifications
that cease to be justified. Such a result would further the guarantee of
equal protection under the laws.
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